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OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND 
ACADEMIC INADEQUACY 
Scott C. Idleman* 
The ultimate supremacy or exclusivity of the Supreme Court's 
constitutional interpretations has been a matter of incremental but 
predictable accretion-a sort of multi-phase leviathan. Almost two 
centuries after Marbury, the horrifying reductio of this incremental-
ism has finally come to pass. In Kazmier v. Widmann-a decision 
that could bring constitutional scholarship as we know it to a halt-
the Fifth Circuit has bluntly declared that "the support of even so 
prominent an academician [as Professor Laurence Tribe] is an inade-
quate substitute for rigorous adherence to recent Supreme Court 
precedent." 1 
Ouch! Laurence Tribe "inadequate"? At first, one might sur-
mise that the court's declaration is just a slip of the pen, a momentary 
indiscretion, and not a considered rule of constitutional authority. So 
benign an interpretation, however, is belied both by the specificity 
and by the absoluteness of its phrasing. Undaunted, one might then 
insist that obviously it relates only to Professor Tribe. Expressio 
unius, right? Wrong. As the greater includes the lesser, one can only 
assume that the Fifth Circuit's rule applies not only to Tribe, but that 
the rest of us, too, are also "an inadequate substitute for rigorous ad-
herence to recent Supreme Court precedent." To be sure, the Su-
preme Court itself had previously suggested as much, remarking in 
1995 that a congressional enactment may still be unconstitutional 
even if "supported by all the law professors in the land ... "2 
There's no way around it. The writings of constitutional schol-
ars may no longer be on par with Supreme Court opinions. At best 
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University. 
I. 225 F.3d 519, 531 (5th Cir. 2000). 
2. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995) (emphasis added); see 
also Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389,394 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that certain Supreme 
Court decisions on the Eleventh Amendment "take one side of the historical controversy 
and by doing so have made it law, whatever law professors or even professional histori-
ans may say"), vacated in part on other grounds, 165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999) (per cu-
riam). 
5 
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such a rule is disheartening; at worst it portends the demise of legal 
academic writing. How difficult it already is, on a sunny summer day 
or a cool autumn evening, to sit in our home offices and churn out le-
gal scholarship. Now we must toil away knowing full well that these 
writings, the very fruit of our labor, will not be binding on the 
courts-that our status as constitutional interpreters has in effect been 
reduced to that of the states and of Congress, if not lower. 3 
Even more troubling is that the Fifth Circuit's rule appears to be 
unfounded. To my knowledge, not one article of legal scholarship--
in contrast to some of these very same judges' decisions-has ever 
been reversed or overruled or formally abrogated, even on other 
grounds. (Preempted, rejected, and criticized perhaps-but never re-
versed, overruled, or abrogated.) Of course, by the same token, not 
one article of legal scholarship to my knowledge has ever been af-
firmed, even summarily or by an equally divided court. 
Is there no silver lining to this dark judicial cloud? Two possi-
bilities suggest themselves. First, the careful reader will note that the 
court's language leaves open the possibility that academic writings 
might still be an adequate substitute for less-than-rigorous adherence 
to recent Supreme Court precedent.4 In tum, we must now make 
every effort, when sending reprints to judges, to target those who do 
not rigorously adhere to Court precedent. The Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools could even develop a list of such judges and include 
it as an appendix in the next directory. 
Second, the passage is by all indications a dictum and therefore 
nonbinding in future cases, even those in which the authority of Laur-
ence Tribe is directly implicated. To the extent that it is precedential, 
moreover, it should have no binding effect on federal courts outside 
of the Fifth Circuit, let alone on state courts, tribal courts, courts of 
foreign nations, or multinational tribunals. And, being merely the 
view of two panel judges (one judge dissented), in time it may very 
well be overruled by the en bane Fifth Circuit.5 
3. Unlike governmental interpretations, academic interpretations may not enjoy a 
presumption of correctness. State courts, moreover, have been deemed to "'have the 
same responsibility and occupy the same position"' as lower federal courts in the field of 
constitutional interpretation. United States ex rei. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 
1075 (7th Cir. 1970) (quoting State v. Coleman, 214 A.2d 393, 403 (N.J. 1965)). Appar-
ently, however, we are assumed to be more legally fluent than the "ordinary citizen[,]" 
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484 (1978), or "the average school board member." 
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,329 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
4. The careful reader will also note that academic writings might still be an ade-
quate substitute for rigorous adherence to not-so-recent Suprem~ Court pre~edent. . 
5. It is interesting to note that the dtssenter, Judge Denms, has prevwusly vmced 
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Let us hope, in the end, that the Kazmier rule is repudiated out-
right for the simple reason that it is wrong. As the Clinton impeach-
ment proceedings so convincingly demonstrated, and as our scholar-
ship so often presupposes, law professors are obviously vital to 
discerning the true meaning of the Constitution. By denying scholars 
their rightful interpretive authority, Kazmier upsets the delicate con-
stitutional equilibrium and needlessly invites a showdown between 
the federal bench and the legal academy. (Indeed, one shudders at the 
prospect of having to impose on judicial nominees an ideological lit-
mus test concerning the authority oflegal scholarship in constitutional 
interpretation.) By rejecting the Kazmier rule, and thereby resisting 
the leviathanical temptation towards judicial supremacy, courts can in 
turn restore this equilibrium and ultimately spare the American people 
from yet another constitutional crisis. 
his support for according interpretive authority to legal scholarship. See, e.g., Krummel 
v. Bombardier Corp., 206 F.3d 548, 553 (5th Cir. 2000) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that "[t]he majority's decision should not be considered a valid precedent ... because it 
radically departs from ... [among other things] the virtually unanimous view of ... legal 
scholars"); Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 328 (5th Cir. 1999) (per Dennis, J.) 
(chastising the district court and appellee for "pay[ing] no heed to any of the other au-
thorities contrary to their position, such as the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court and the learned works of civil- and common-law scholars"). 
